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The notion that electoral history may be divided into long periods of stability 
broken periodically by major shocks has been the central organizing motif 
of American political history for a generation. Drawing on the simple 
empirical observation that the balance of electoral support for the major 
American political parties across geographic units remained roughly the 
same for a sequence of contests, and then shifted rather suddenly into a new 
and lasting pattern, V. 0. Key, Jr., Lee Benson, Walter Dean Burnham, and 
others sought to do more than provide descriptive tags for conventional 
historical "eras." They attempted, by relating political to social cleavages, to 
explain why voters' decisions stood for so long (for instance, in Benson's 
"ethnocultural thesis"), and to show how wars, depressions, institutional 
changes, or intraparty struggles undermined these stable voting configura- 
tions (for instance, in Paul Kleppner's view that a common revulsion to the 
Democrats' failure to avoid economic depression combined with a dif- 
ferentiated voter response to Bryan's fundamentalist Protestant zeal shifted 
the social correlates of politics in the 1890s). Realizing that since it was 
based on aggregate election data, their hypothesis of stability and change 
was susceptible to the "ecological fallacy" of inferring individual behavior 
from measures available only for collectivities, the critical elections theorists 
tried, in effect, to supplement aggregate returns for the past with evidence of 
the long-term stability of party identification drawn from recent surveys. 
Focusing attention more closely on certain crucial variables and contests, 
encouraging political scientists to escape their parochial habit of present- 
mindedness and historians to overcome their predilection for concentrating 
too much on details and too little on basic patterns, the concept of normal 
elections broken by swift realignments has been beneficial to both disciplines. 
Yet the notion suffers from four major deficiencies, two of which the 
book under review seeks to remedy: In the first place, the idea of critical 
realignment, basically an empirical generalization, has no clearly stated 
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macro- or micro-theoretical underpinning. Just why do individual voters 
retain or alter their habits? What are the connections between changing 
institutional constraints and individual electoral decisions? Second, local, 
state, and national trends have been far from exactly congruent. What ex- 
plains the divergences, and are they so grave as to undermine the larger 
generalizations, based as they are primarily on national presidential returns? 
Third, how can the notion best be statistically measured? How much 
change is "a lot?" How inert do stable periods have to be? And if different 
measuring techniques lead to different results, how can they be reconciled? 
Finally, since the primary purpose of voting is presumably to affect govern- 
mental policy, how are votes translated into policy decisions? In their thirteen 
essays the authors, who are all political scientists, make only a token effort 
to provide a coherent theory of realignment, recognize but do not attack the 
problem of different national and subnational patterns, and finesse the issue 
of measuring stability and change in the electorate entirely by merely 
assuming that certain elections were realigning and that others were not. For 
historians, who have devoted too little attention to the connection between 
voting and policy, the major interest in the volume lies in the six essays 
which deal with that connection. 
Doubting that voters can markedly influence policy during periods of 
stability because their intentions may be unclear, or because key elected or 
appointed officials may have little incentive to respond to the voters' wishes, 
Bruce Campbell and Richard Trilling (following Burnham's argument in his 
1970 book on critical elections) suggest in the first chapter that massive 
realignments play a crucial role in a democracy by periodically reestablishing 
voter sovereignty. Shaken out of their thoughtless or information-econo- 
mizing lethargy by social or economic crises, many voters leave their former 
parties, and, either punishing incumbents or voting on the basis of new 
issues, help oust extraordinary numbers of sitting politicians, whose dis- 
placement upsets formerly settled relationships both within the legislature 
and the bureaucracy and between the two. While this is a useful skeleton 
which is fleshed out in several of the succeeding essays, it ignores the fact 
that major alterations in policy have sometimes taken place even without 
lasting realignments (for example, the passage of the Reconstruction Acts 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, made possible by the temporarily lopsided 
Republican congressional majorities of 1866), fails to account for the fact 
that some realignments (for instance, the Rep,ublican landslides of 1894-96) 
have not produced important policy changes, and draws too heavily on the 
twentieth-century pattern of relatively slow turnover in legislative and 
bureaucratic posts, a pattern which did not hold in the nineteenth century, 
when, after all, four of the five elections conventionally deemed "critical" 
occurred. 
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Only two of the volume's contributors dissent from the book's orthodoxy 
about the importance of critical realignments. In an essay on secular realign- 
ment which emphasizes changes in the party balance caused by the slow 
growth or decline in the homogeneity of political attitudes within specified 
groups and by migration and differential population growth across groups, 
Louis M. Seagull remarks that "critical realignment has received undue and 
possibly inappropriate attention" (p. 69). And in a chapter which demon- 
strates the miniscule effects of the Watergate scandal on partisan attitudes 
and on levels of acceptance of the two-party system, Robert G. Lehnen 
concludes that "it is time to put aside the distractions created by the promise 
of finding 'revolutionary' changes and structural realignments and to con- 
front the consequences that day-to-day politics have for most citizens" 
(p. 131). The other essayists usually keep more closely to Campbell and 
Trilling's initial framework. 
But this framework hardly constitutes the "integrated theory of realign- 
ment" promised in the preface. Instead of offering a full explanation of how 
and why different voters and political entrepreneurs react to crises which 
render their usual decision rules useless, Trilling and Lawrence C. McMichael 
seek merely to define terms and describe, with terribly blunt statistical 
instruments, an instance of apparent realignment in Pennsylvania from 
1924 to 1940 in the second essay. (Regrettably, they seem unaware of Allan J. 
Lichtman's 1976 American Historical Review article, and therefore escape 
having to deal with his very different and much more nuanced portrayal of 
the same elections.) Since neither of the two main branches of theory about 
electoral behavior explains major shifts-social-psychological theory views 
party loyalty as a deep-seated habit largely inculcated in the socialization 
process, and rational choice theory assumes stable voter tastes-one may 
sympathize with the authors' inability to supply a theory, yet at the same 
time wish they had confronted this most significant of all current tasks in 
the study of realignment. 
The essayists are much better at describing the mechanisms of policy 
change. In a paper relating realignments to the age and social status of 
Congressmen from 1870 to 1970, Lester G. Seligman and Michael R. King 
find that losers and winners of congressional elections resembled each other 
fairly closely during stable periods, but that they were much more sharply 
differentiated in the years around 1896 and 1932. For instance, winning 
challengers were on the average about six years younger than losing in- 
cumbents in 1928, but seventeen years younger in 1932, and the age gap 
returned to a more normal nine-year difference by 1938. These differences, 
which paralleled gaps in social status, at least in the thirties, were common 
to both political parties. That is to say, in both the Republican and Demo- 
cratic parties, older, higher status cohorts lost out to younger, lower status 
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individuals around the time of the electoral shifts. This shift in the character 
of lawmakers suggests both how new policies get adopted and why, once 
adopted, they are not repealed when the electoral tides recede. The old 
guard does not return, for it has been retired from leadership in both parties. 
Based primarily on the 1930s, Seligman and King's generalization might not 
apply so well to earlier periods, when the typical level of congressional 
replacement was much higher, but a longer-term analysis of indices similar 
to those which they have gathered might explain a great deal about national 
policy changes even in years when lasting electoral shifts did not occur. 
Although Seligman and King do not relate turnover directly to policy, in 
a parallel essay David W. Brady does examine the relations between gross 
turnover in Congress and its key committees, as well as changes in the party 
balance in Congress, and indices of policy change developed by Benjamin 
Ginsburg in a 1976 article in the American Political Science Review. Dis- 
covering weaker connections than he had expected (perhaps because of the 
difficulty of measuring his dependent variable precisely), Brady postulates, 
without systematically testing it, a model in which, for major policy shifts to 
occur, voters have to choose a new president with a firm program, plus a 
new congressional majority. Although this model is so vague-what is a 
coherent program? -and so close to tautology as to be nearly useless, Brady's 
results do somewhat undercut those of Seligman and King, but unfortu- 
nately neither essay includes comments on the other. 
In an excellent review of the burgeoning literature on bureaucratic be- 
havior, Kenneth J. Meier and Kenneth W. Kramer show why rational bureau- 
crats do not respond to small short-term electoral shifts. Overloaded with 
information from sources other than the electorate and elected officials, 
protected by a merit system, by professional or "scientific" standards, by 
stable clientele relationships, and sometimes by legal autonomy, split on 
policy goals within and between agencies, established bureaucracies, Meier 
and Kramer hypothesize, will inhibit major changes unless their personnel 
are physically replaced. The extent of change from policy area to area, 
moreover, should be related to the legal independence of the relevent agencies 
and to the strength of their nonelectoral ties. Since replacement takes time, 
only a lasting electoral realignment will affect policies in many areas, and 
the policy shifts should be greatest where new bureaus are created or older 
bureaus are weakest, as, for instance, during the New Deal, or in state and 
local governments, which have bureaucracies which are both smaller and 
less secure than those of the national government. While they do not test 
these hypotheses, twentieth-century historians might, assuming they can 
solve the thorny problem of creating measures of bureaucratic strength and 
of policy change. 
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While some scholars have credited the Supreme Court with the role of 
legitimating policy shifts after realignments, David Adamany demonstrates 
convincingly through an analysis of recent opinion polls that the public and 
even political activities are insufficiently aware of the Court's decisions, 
particularly those which do not overturn laws or executive actions, for the 
Court to play such a role. He is less convincing in offering an alternative 
theory. Positing a mysterious inherent tendency for the Court and the 
executive to join together in opposition to the Congress, Adamany suggests 
that the Court, allying itself with the "presidential wing" of the prerealign- 
ment majority party, helps bring on realignment by sharpening policy dif- 
ferences within that party and between the two parties. But even if he could 
rigorously account for the alleged coalitional tendency and justify his use of 
the idea that presidential/congressional dichotomies within the majority 
party pervaded American history (the period from 1869 to 1892 would be 
particularly troublesome), Adamany only claims his hypothesis works for 
five of eight assumed cases of national conversion or realignment, and if one 
insists that the judicial and electoral decisions be closely related in time 
(why should the impact of the 1905 decision in Lockner be delayed until 
1932?), he would have a lower box score. 
Emphasizing election-oriented speeches rather than roll call votes, which 
he believes distort congressmen's real views because of the influence of 
party loyalty, Charles V. Stewart charts changes in congressional opinion 
on the income tax from 1894 to 1913. Why did Democrats split on the 
income tax issue in the Fifty-third Congress, why was GOP rhetoric so 
vehement then, and why was opposition to the tax so comparatively weak 
and subdued by 1913? Stewart believes that in 1894 the passage of the 
income tax "threatened to crystallize an alliance productive of more funda- 
mental reform" (p. 279); whereas by 1913 the Democratic-progressive 
Republican combination seemed much tamer. There are two major problems 
with this explanation: First, although some opponents feared the income tax 
would be a precedent for more "socialistic" measures, such a fear is not the 
same as a belief that passage of a 2 percent tax on incomes over four 
thousand dollars would itself weld together a radical alliance, as Stewart 
claims, and is even less a demonstration that it in fact would have solidified 
a farmer-labor party, as he comes close to saying. Second, Stewart vastly 
oversimplifies his story by leaving out shifts in sentiment on the protective 
tariff, for which the proceeds of an income tax were a substitute. In the 
1890s protectionists were still puissant and must have realized, though they 
were naturally unlikely to say so on the floor of Congress, that the develop- 
ment of a major alternate source of revenue would diminish support for the 
tariff; by 1913, as Susan B. Hansen points out in the final essay in the book, 
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manufacturing exports had for more than a decade exceeded imports, the 
free trade constituency was consequently large enough to pass the Under- 
wood tariff easily, and the revenue had to be made up somehow. 
Hansen draws on a 1960 World Politics article by Anthony Downs in her 
ambitious exploration of two centuries of American tax policy. Rejecting 
the view that war or economic development account satisfactorily for tax 
policy because such factors do not explain very well the timing of changes 
or differences in tax rates across social groups or counties, Hansen focuses 
on variations in the political saliency of taxes and in the power of each 
political party. Since federal revenue consumed only about 5 percent of the 
GNP in 1870, as opposed to more than 20 percent today, federal taxes could 
not have been as politically salient then, she reasons, and politicians were 
probably freer to advocate raising them without suffering retaliation at the 
polls. Hansen's content analysis of references to taxes in national party 
platforms lends some support to this argument, for the amount of discus- 
sion of tax-related issues grew throughout the nineteenth century, only to be 
reduced in recent times to ritual pledges of lower taxes, and the two political 
parties took opposing positions on taxes more often then than they do now. 
As taxes have risen as a proportion of national income, politicians have 
increasingly indexed them to benefits or passed decision-making power-and 
potential blame-to experts. While not sufficient in itself, unified party 
control of the national government has been a necessary condition for 
important alterations in tax policy, Hansen shows in an insightful overview 
of tax policy changes from 1800 through the New Deal, and such sustained 
control has most often been associated with critical realignments. 
While the authors of this book ignore or offer only very unsatisfactory 
solutions to several of the problems now apparent in the concept of critical 
realignments, the work should serve as a convenient introduction for 
historians to the developing political science literature on the connections 
between elections and policy, and on the policy process itself. Why should 
all the fun of explaining a century or more of policy be left to political 
scientists? 
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